

A Multiresolution Time-Frequency Analysis Based Side Channel Attacks

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1. Introduction

- Physical security of embedded systems has always been an open question and usually treated as an integral part of embedded system design.
- Side-Channel Analysis are one of the most powerful attacks on embedded systems since they are non-invasive, low cost and easily mount in practice.
- Embedded systems should be evaluated against Side-Channel Analyses [1][2].
- We provide the evaluator with a multiresolution analysis (Wavelets transform) based three techniques to assess the robustness of embedded systems against Side-Channel Analysis:
 - Cryptographic patterns detection.
 - Side-Channel noise filtering.
 - Side-Channel Attacks.




Fig. 1. Side Channel attacks on embedded systems

2. Multiresolution principle

Continuous Wavelets Transform (CWT):

$$WT_X(\tau, s) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|s|}} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} X(t) \psi\left(\frac{t-\tau}{s}\right) dt$$

- Characterization in both the frequency and temporal domain.
- Multi-scale resolution (shifting and scaling window) to obtain both a good time resolution and a good frequency resolution.

Discrete Wavelets Transform (DWT):

- Filter banks: separate the signal into two different frequency band
Filter banks increases the frequency resolution
- Down-sampling ($\downarrow 2$): keep only one point in two
Down-sampling decreases the temporal resolution

- Approximations: the coefficients associated to the low frequency band
- Details: the coefficients associated to the high frequency band




Fig. 2. Illustration of 3-level wavelets decomposition

3. Cryptographic patterns detection




Fig. 3. 2D-CWT representation for AES encryptions detection

4. Side-Channel noise filtering




Fig. 4. Combining mutual information and Donoho's threshold to filter noise

5. DWT in the very core of the attack

- Goal: to improve all standard methods (generic)
- Method: to perform standard SCA attacks on the wavelet coefficient
- Benefits:
 - Avoid loss of information caused by wavelet reconstruction
 - Avoid noise due to temporal de-synchronization




Fig. 5. CPA success rate

6. Conclusion

- Wavelet transform allows many applications in SCA context: patterns detection, noise filtering, traces compression and secret key recovery
- All these applications establish a SCA methodology

References

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- FX Standaert, Tal Malkin, and Moti Yung. A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks. In EUROCRYPT 2009.